This paper investigates the effects of firm openness and bribery on bank lending decisions. Using World Bank data covering 1869 private firms, we find evidence that paying bribes helps firms obtain bank credit in China. But after adding firm openness into the analysis, the significance of the effect of bribery on banking finance disappears. Instead, we find that banks in China prefer to allocate loans to firms with a higher level of openness. This finding holds true only for large firms, manufacturing firms, and firms located in regions with good banking development. We also find that private firms with greater government assistance are more likely to obtain bank loans, and more credit overall. Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of firm openness and bribery on bank lending decisions. Using World Bank data covering 1869 private firms, we find evidence that paying bribes helps firms obtain bank credit in China. But after adding firm openness into the analysis, the significance of the effect of bribery on banking finance disappears. Instead, we find that banks in China prefer to allocate loans to firms with a higher level of openness. This finding holds true only for large firms, manufacturing firms, and firms located in regions with good banking development. We also find that private firms with greater government assistance are more likely to obtain bank loans, and more credit overall.
Introduction
China has a predominantly state-owned banking system, which features an enormous, underdeveloped banking sector controlled mainly by the largest state-owned banks. For a considerably long period, the main role of banks in China was to carry out policy lending following the government's instruction, rather than to operate in line with commercial considerations (Brandt and Li, 2003) . Consequently, the financial resources from the banking sector are mostly controlled by the government and used to support state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the development of private sector has been hampered by limited access to banking finance (Bai et al., 2006; Dong et al., 2014) . This paper aims to investigate the determinants affecting banks' lending decisions when allocating loans to private firms.
Corruption in the financial sector in China is not unusual. Pei (2008) and Chen et al. (2013) document the prevalence of bribes or kickbacks for loan approvals by banks over a lengthy period. Considering the superior bargaining power of banks in the borrowing-lending relationship, one might expect that in China, private firms paying bribes to bank officials more easily access banking finance and obtain more bank credit. However, Huang and Rice (2012) among others, argue that as China has been increasingly open and market-oriented, firm 'openness' becomes an important, yet poorly exploited factor in explaining some of financing behaviors.
The concept of firm openness was first introduced by Laursen and Salter (2003) , which states that openness is a strategy for firms to search external sources of information. A firm's openness not only exhibits its enhanced engagement in inter-organizational networking and collaboration, such as knowledge exchange between firms and other economic agents like business partners and cooperated universities or research institutions Salter 2006, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009; Zhang, 2009; Huang and Rice, 2012) , but also increases information disclosure to outsiders, including banks.
In this paper, we use data from the World Bank to investigate the effects of firm bribery and firm openness on bank lending decisions towards private firms in China. Our sample consists of 1869 private Chinese firms, derived from the China: Investment Climate Survey 2003. We believe this dataset is suitable for the discussion of this paper since we aim to investigate that after China's entry to World Trade Organization in 2001, whether bank officials had concentrated on screening borrowers for quality or asking for bribes. The answer to this question can help to reflect the impacts of the market-oriented reform of the banking sector.
We find supportive evidence on the role of firm bribery in helping private firms obtain bank credit, when the effect of firm openness is ignored. However, once firm openness is considered, the significance of firm bribery disappears. Our baseline regression shows a positive relation between firm openness and banking finance, which is consistent with the notion that openness reduces information asymmetry. The effect is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. For example, a one standard deviation increase in firm openness is associated with a 36.79 per cent increase in the size of banking finance relative to its sample mean. From sub-sample tests, we find that firm openness only improves access to banking finance for large firms, manufacturing firms and firms located in regions with good banking development. The results are robust to alternative measures of openness and bribery, different econometric specifications and considerations of endogeneity issues.
This study contributes to the literature in the following respects. We provide the first empirical evidence on the impact of firm openness on firms' bank debt. Among the studies exploring the bank-firm relationship, a literature stream documents the positive impact of bribery on firms' bank debt (e.g., Chen et al. (2013) and Fungáčová et al. (2015) ).
Compared with these studies, this paper further introduces the factor of firm openness in addition to bribery based on the notion that firms become more open by communicating with other firms and organizations and in the process release more information to lenders, and thus facilitates firms' bank borrowing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on the determinants of banks' lending decisions and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample processing and research design. We present key empirical findings in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
Literature review and hypotheses development

Bribery and bank financing
Focusing on country-level corruption, which is normally defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, several studies investigate the effect of corruption on bank credit but find mixed results. For example, Weill (2011) finds country-level corruption reduces bank credit and he attributes his finding to the reason that more corruption indicates a lower quality of the legal institutions that protect banks and enforce contracts. In contrast, document that firms in more corrupt countries tend to use more debt.
Apart from country-level corruption, corruption can also take place within the lending process through bribing bank officials to obtain bank loans Beck et al., 2006 ). Regarding the firm-level relationship between bribery and bank debt, Fungáčová et al. (2015) find evidence that bribing bank officials facilitates firms' access to bank loans for a sample of firms in 14 transition countries. As for China, its banking system has long featured the dominance of state ownership in banks, and the main role of banks has been to lend to SOEs as per the government directive (Firth et al., 2009) . With the reform of the banking sector since mid-1990s, banks were transformed from policy tools into real market entities. Brandt and Li (2003) , however, identify the bank discrimination problem in China's financial market. Bank discrimination refers to the phenomenon of state-owned banks discriminating against private firms for non-profit reasons. In this institutional background, private firms are expected to pay bribes to bank officials and loan officers to obtain bank loans. In a recent study, Chen et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that paying bribes contributes to an increase in a firm's bank debt in China.
Based on the abovementioned discussion, we propose the following hypothesis about the role of bribery in banks' allocation of loans:
H1.1: All else being equal, paying bribes to bank officials helps private firms get access to banking finance more easily and obtain more bank loans.
Taking bribes, however, has potential consequences for bank officials (Wu, 2005) .
First, taking bribes exposes bank officials to substantial legal risks. Bank officials involved in taking bribes will bear the risk of legal actions, including prosecution, fines, or even jail sentences against them if the bribe-taking acts are caught. Second, bank officials taking bribes and allocating loans to firms lacking in quality will bring substantial financial risk for banks and thus block their path for promotion. More specifically, if a firm's manager resorts to bribery to obtain bank loans rather than show the firm's better products or services, innovation activities, investment projects, or competitiveness, bank officials could reasonably consider this firm as an unfavorable customer and refuse to provide it with a loan. Otherwise, the bank bears a potential financial risk of the firm defaulting. Bank officials that value their reputation and/or potential promotion opportunities would be more reluctant to bear this kind of risk. In addition, because most banks in China, and state-owned banks in particular, have no incentive or tradition of providing loans to private firms, bank officials might find bribes not to be worth the cost of their reputation and career.
Moreover, with the ongoing reform and commercialization of China's banking sector, especially after China's entry to the WTO, a stricter disciplinary system and performance-based incentive mechanism were introduced for bank executives and staff, encouraging them to manage risk and improve performance more effectively. For example, strict internal guidelines have been implied in the loan-making process. According to these guidelines, banks are required to separate the function of credit risk assessment from the loan management function. An important checks and balances system is also brought in to ensure an efficient and effective connection between these two functions (Chen et al., 2013 
Firm openness and bank financing
Information asymmetries occur between the suppliers and recipients of finance where one party (finance recipients) has more, or better, information than the other (finance suppliers) does. Banks face substantial information asymmetry when screening qualified borrowers.
The information gap between banks and firms would hamper the efficient allocation of financial resources, which may lead to either credit rating (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or a wedge between lending and borrowing rates (King, 1986) .
As Jõeveer (2013) argues, given the newness of financial markets and general opacity of business connections in transition and emerging countries, problems of asymmetric information are expected to be especially large. Public credit registry or private credit bureaus are seen as important sources of information for banks to screen eligible borrowers.
However, in China the absence of these institutions exacerbated the problem of information asymmetry. Laursen and Salter (2003) introduce the concept of firm openness, which may influence banks' lending decision in the situation of information asymmetry. Fontana et al. (2003) extend the definition of openness as a knowledge-exchange process involving the combination of a searching strategy with a signaling activity. An important implication of Fontana et al. (2003) 's definition is that the signaling role of a firm's openness should be understood as an information-disclosing process by which firms inform the outside environment about the range of their competencies.
In the borrowing-lending scenario, research and practice show banks make lending decisions based on not only 'hard' quantitative criteria, such as balance sheets and income statement information, but also 'soft' qualitative information like ownership structure and the industry situation of borrowers (Berger and Udell, 2002; Yeung, 2009 ). Openness, acting as an important form of 'soft' qualitative information, could help substantially to alleviate the level of information asymmetry and to serve as a source of decision-related information for bank officials. The role of firm openness is important particularly when lending to the private sector, in which the information asymmetry is more severe (Firth et al., 2009 ). Based on the discussions above mentioned we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: All else being equal, the higher openness of a private firm is associated with greater access to bank financing and larger amount of bank loans.
Sample and variables
The sample
The data for this study is drawn mainly from 
Bribery
As both paying and taking bribes are illegal in China, there is no direct or observable data from the dataset on whether private firms actually paid bribes to bank officials for obtaining bank loans. Instead, we follow Cai et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013) , and use the amount of entertainment and travel costs (ETC) scaled by sales as the proxy for bribery.
In Chinese firm accounting books, ETC is a standard expenditure item and is used supposedly for reimbursing normal business expenses required by firms in their normal operations. However, in practice, ETC not only includes expenses for legitimate travel and other expenses, but also covers expenditures used commonly to bribe government or bank officials, clients, and suppliers, or simply to account for implicit CEO pay and managerial excesses.
Empirically, we generate the value of ETC based on the answer to the key question in ETC by sales to proxy for the bribe payments to bank officials. In the robustness test, we also construct an alternative measure of bribe payments to banks and include it in the regression analysis (see the robustness test for details).
Firm openness
Following Laursen and Salter (2006) , Zhang (2009) and Huang and Rice (2012) , we proxy for 'firm openness' in a broader perspective based on the responses relating to whether or not the firm had engaged in any contractual or long-standing relationship with universities, research institutions, or other firm. Firm openness is assigned values between 0 and 3. The value of 0 is used for no relationship with any of the three kinds of organization, 1 when the relationship is with any one of the three kinds of organization, 2 when the relationship is with any two of the three kinds of organization and 3 when the relationship is with all three kinds of organizations. Firth et al. (2009) find that Chinese banks extend loans to financially healthier firms.
Control variables
Following Firth et al. (2009) , we use a one-year lagged return on sales (ROS) to measure firm performance, which is calculated using the one-year lagged earnings before interest and taxes divided by total sales. Research agrees that political connection is a valuable asset that may have a favorable effect on bank lending decisions (Dinc, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006) . In this paper, we use government help (Govt help) to measure political connection, otherwise. Since Svensson (2005) finds that higher GDP per capita is related to less corruption, we include the variable 'GDP per capita'. Since the dataset that we use includes 2400 responding firms located in 18 cities, the city-level GDP per capita is used, which is the natural logarithm of gross national product per capita in each city where each firm locates. City population is the natural logarithm of population of the city in which the firm is located. As Li et al. (2009) and Firth et al. (2009) 'Non-bribery' and 'Bribery' refer to firms without and with bribe payments, respectively.
The results suggest that paying bribes does help private firms with their banking finance, and provides preliminary support for Hypothesis 1.1. We test this relation in a multivariate framework in the following section.
Panel C presents the univariate test for firms with low and high bribe payments.
'Low-bribery' and 'High-bribery' refer to firms with low bribe payments (below the median) and high bribe payments (above the median), respectively. Interestingly, this panel
indicates that compared with private firms that pay high bribes, those paying low bribes get larger access to bank financing and obtain more bank loans. This result is discussed in Section 4.4.3.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Empirical results
The effect of private firm's bribery on its bank financing
To explore the impact of firm bribery on bank financing, we model a bank official's latent response as follows:
where the subscript i indicates a firm. As defined in Section 3.2.1, the dependent variable bank financing measures a firm's access to banking finance and the amount of the loan granted by the banks. We use Logit models for specifications where access to bank finance is the dependent variable, and ordinary least squares (OLS) models for those where the size of the bank loan is the dependent variable. The results of the effect of private firm's bribery on its bank financing are shown in Table 3 . We first run the regressions that include 'standard' determinants of bank credit like firm profitability, size, age, bank competition and proxies for the macroeconomic environment including GDP per capita, city population and development of banking sector (see Column (1) and (2)). A set of corporate governance measures (see Column (3) and (4)) and bribery (see Column (5) and (6)) are added to the estimations subsequently.
[Insert Table 3 here]
As seen in Column (1) and (2), firm performance measured by lagged ROS is positively and significantly associated with both access to and size of banking finance. This result is consistent with that of Firth et al. (2009) , who argue that banks tend to allocate loans to financially healthier firms. When we add corporate governance measures into the estimations (see Column (3) and (4), Table 3 ), firm performance is positively related to access to banking finance and size of banking finance at 10 and 1 per cent level, respectively. But there is no consistently significant relation between bank debt measures and governance measures. Then we add firm bribery into the analysis. As shown in Column (6), bribery is found to be positively and significantly related to size of banking finance. This result suggests that bribery plays a positive effect on helping private firms obtain more bank loans. Firth et al. (2009) . No significant relationship between bank competition and bank financing is found, which is inconsistent with the findings of Barth et al. (2009) . This result may be due to the situation that China's predominantly state-owned banking sector features substantial discrimination towards private firms. The coefficient of firm size is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, revealing that larger firms are more likely to obtain bank loans.
The effect of private firm's openness on its bank financing
Compared to the work done in Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013) , which examines the effect of firm performance and bribery on bank's lending decisions, this paper further investigates the effect of firm openness on bank's lending to private firms. Thus we construct the following model:
where the subscript i indicates a firm. The dependent variable bank financing measures a firm's access to banking finance and the amount of the loan granted by the banks.
Compared with Equation (1), firm openness is added as one of the independent variables.
We use Logit models for specifications where access to bank finance is the dependent variable, and OLS models for those where the size of the bank loan is the dependent variable. The empirical results are shown in Table 4 2 .
[Insert Table 4 here]
When considering the potential effect of firm openness, compared to that in Table 3, neither ROS nor bribery is significantly related to firm's access to banking finance (see Column (1), Table 4 ). But our variable of interest, firm openness, shows a significantly positive effect on firm's access to banking finance. This result suggests that increased firm openness results in a greater likelihood of a firm obtaining banking finance, even after controlling for firm performance, bribery and other possible determinants. For the interaction term between bribery and openness, the insignificant coefficient indicates that the interaction effect between bribery and openness on a firm's bank financing is not strong.
In Column (2) of Table 4 , ROS is significant but bribery is insignificant when firm openness is included. The coefficient of openness is 0.0219, which is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that firm openness could reduce the level of information asymmetry encountered by banks and reassure them to grant more loans. The effect is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. For example, a one standard deviation increase in firm openness is associated with a 36.79 per cent increase in the size of banking finance relative to its sample mean.
To conclude, the effect of paying bribes on obtaining bank loans disappears once the firm openness factor is considered, which indicates the relationship between bribery and bank financing found in Chen et al. (2013) might be absorbed by firm openness. In other words, bank officials are more informed by firm openness instead of bribe payments from firms when making lending decisions. Therefore, after considering firm openness, Hypothesis 1.1 is no longer supported, while Hypothesis 1.2 and Hypothesis 2 are supported.
Sub-sample tests
Theoretically, small firms are less transparent, which makes the information asymmetry issue more severe when bank officials are dealing with these firms. Therefore, banks may prefer large firms, which are typically more open and thus have more information sources available for the bank to know about the firm. Our results in Table 3 and Table 4 provide supportive evidence that banks allocate more credit to large firms. To take a closer look at the role of firm size in helping firms obtain bank loans, we split our entire sample into two sub-samples by firm size following Firth et al. (2009) . Specifically, a firm is categorized as a large (small) firm if its size is above (below) the sample median. The results are presented in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 here]
Firm openness does not show a significant association with both access to banking finance and size of banking finance in small firms (see Column (1) and (2), Table 5 ).
However, openness is related positively and significantly to bank financing, regardless of which bank financing measure is used in large firms (see Column (3) and (4), Table 5 ).
The results suggest that openness is a more important determinant for large firms than for small firms in banks' lending decisions. This might be partly because small firms usually have fewer opportunities to show their openness. In other words, it is difficult for small firms to enter into contractual or long-term relationships with other firms, universities, or research institutes. In both small and large firms, we find no evidence supporting bribery's role in helping private firms obtain bank credits when firm openness is included.
Firms operating in different industries might be subject to different industry conditions, such as industry regulations, market competition, external financial dependence, and level of information asymmetry (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . Thus, we include a set of industry dummies to control for the variation among industries in Tables 3 and Table 4 .
Considering that our sample size is not large and the sample firms are not distributed equally, this might bias the results. Therefore, we divide the entire sample into two groups according to firms' industry. Specifically, accounting and the non-banking financial services, advertisement and marketing, and business services are reclassified as 'service industry', while other sectors are reclassified as 'manufacturing industry'. The regression results are shown in Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 here]
For manufacturing firms only, openness displays a positive and significant effect on size of banking finance (see Column (2), Table 6 ). The lack of significance of relationship between openness and bank financing for firms in the service industry might be attributed to the lesser need for these firms to build long-term or contractual relationships with other organizations. Again, we do not find supportive evidence on the role of bribery in helping firms obtain banking finance when firm openness is inclusive.
Institutional environment is found to have a substantial effect on firms' operations (e.g., Firth et al., 2009 ). Chen et al. (2006) argue that an outstanding feature of China's economy is the imbalance in terms of the development of banking sector, in particular in different regions. Locations with better banking sector development can be expected to provide more opportunities for firms to acquire bank loans. To investigate the influence of banking sector marketization on firms' bank financing further, we split the entire sample into a poor banking development group and a good banking development group. Specifically, firms are classified in the good (or poor) banking development group if the value of banking sector marketization for their location is above (or below) the sample median. The results are presented in Table 7 .
[Insert Table 7 here]
As in Table 7 , openness is found to have a positive and significant effect on firms' bank financing only for firms located in regions with higher banking sector marketization.
This result implies that in areas with a developed banking sector, banks have more incentive and skills to capture information about potential borrowers, including the information released through firms' communications and collaborations with other organizations. Similarly, in these regions, bribery is found to have no significant effect on firms' bank financing.
Robustness tests 3 4.4.1. Alternative measures for bribery
In the main test, we follow Cai et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013) and use the amount of ETC scaled by sales as the proxy for bribery. Given the fact that the amount of loan is scaled by total assets as one of dependent variables, we also conduct the robustness test by scaling bribes using total assets. Our results are robust in this case.
In addition, similar to Beck et al. (2007) and Barth et al. (2009) 's work, we construct a measure of bribe payments based on the key question in relation to firms' bribe payments.
The question takes the following form: 'In your dealings with bank officials and loan officers, was a gift or informal payment expected?' We include a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent's answer is 'Yes', and 0 otherwise, to measure firms' bribe payments to bank officials. The empirical results are consistent with our main results.
Alternative measures for openness
In our paper, contractual or long-standing relationship with a university, research institution or other firms is used to proxy for firm openness. But most firms could have many kinds of connection with other firms as long as they operate, such as suppliers. To ensure our results
are not driven by alternative measures of openness, we perform a robustness test by using the relationship with suppliers (the natural logarithm of the total number of suppliers of the key raw materials and/or the key service bought from) as a measure of firm openness. The results show that the alternative proxy of openness is positively associated with banking finance (measured by 'size of banking finance').
In addition, Ricci and Trionfetti (2012) 
Test for non-linear relationship between bribery and loans
The results of univariate tests in Panel C of Table 2 show that firms pay lower bribes get larger access to bank financing and obtain more bank loans, which reveal there might be a non-linear relationship between bribery and bank loans. Thus, we include bribery squared terms in the regressions. The results show that no matter if the bribery squared term is included, our main results hold.
Self-selection issue
The value of ETC might be measured with errors since we do not know for sure if a firm indeed paid bribes. In order to resolve this self-selection bias, we use the bribery measure (whether a gift or informal payment was expected while dealing with bank officials) from the robustness check Section 4.4.1 to instrument the main bribery measure based on ETC in the baseline regression, and then include the instrumental variable in the second-stage regression. The results show that after instrumenting the bribery measure, openness is consistently associated with bank debt.
Endogeneity issue
To address the possible endogeneity issue between bribery, firm openness and bank loans, we used the industry-city bribery (openness) averages to instrument individual firm bribes (openness) in the robustness test. Our results are robust after addressing this endogeneity concern.
Conclusions
Debt financing is the predominant source of external funds for China's corporations, but the Chinese debt market is comprised of an undeveloped corporate bond market and dominated by a state-owned banking sector. In this paper, using data from the World Bank covering 1869 private firms in China, we investigate the effects of bribery and firm openness on banks' lending decisions towards private firms in China.
Before considering the effect of firm openness, we find supportive evidence on the role of bribery in helping private firms obtain bank credit, which is consistent with Chen et al. (2013) . However, after adding firm openness into our analysis, the significance of bribery disappears. Instead, we find that banks in China prefer to allocate loans to firms with a higher level of openness since higher level of openness is associated with more information disclosure and thus alleviate information asymmetry when banks make lending decisions.
After conducting sub-sample tests, this finding is found to hold true only for large firms, manufacturing firms, and firms located in regions with good banking development. This result suggests that firms of these kinds may drive the positive and significant relationship between openness and bank financing.
The finding that bribe payments to bank officials do not help firms as much as openness in obtaining banking finance has at least three important implications. First, given the long tradition of bribery in the Chinese context, bank officials concentrating on screening borrowers for quality rather than asking for bribes reflects the development of China's market environment and the achievement of banking sector reform in China.
Second, this finding encourages firms to develop long-term competitive advantages. By way of explanation, if managers come to believe that they can win bank loans more effectively through bribery rather than through improving their operational performance, they will potentially spend more time courting bank officials than focusing on innovation 25 activities and making better investment decisions. Such an approach would damage their long-term growth (Wu, 2005) . Third, during a transition process from a planned economy to a market economy, private firms in China have the necessity to focus their endeavors on improving openness rather than the traditional ways, which include paying bribes.
We also find private firms with better financial performance, of a larger size, and with more government assistance are more likely to obtain bank loans and loans of a greater size, which are consistent with the findings of Firth et al. (2009) . But we do not find consistently supportive evidence on the role of corporate governance of private firms in obtaining bank loans, which supports the findings of Yao et al. (2010) . Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report the important coefficients in this table. Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report the important coefficients in this table. Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report the important coefficients in this table.
